Recent fiscal interventions have raised concerns about US public debt, future fiscal pressure, and long-run economic growth. This paper studies fiscal policy design in an economy in which: (i) the household has recursive preferences and is averse to both short-and long-run uncertainty, and (ii) growth is endogenously sustained through innovations whose market value is sensitive to the tax system. By reallocating tax distortions through debt, fiscal policy alters the composition of intertemporal consumption risk and the incentives to innovate, ultimately affecting long-term growth.
Introduction
After the onset of the financial crisis in fall 2008, the world has witnessed government interventions on a unprecedented scale. All over the globe, governments massively increased spending in an attempt to prevent the world economy from slipping into a major global depression. While the recent return of the world economy to positive growth appears to indicate that the governments' efforts at short-run stabilization were successful, the question about the long-term effects of these policies arises naturally. In line with such fiscal stimulus packages go sharp increases in projected government debt. In the United States, the congressional budget office estimates government debt to reach the level of GDP by 2012, and to be around 277% of GDP by 2040. While these projections are conditional on current tax regimes, it is clear that such massive bursts in government expenditures need to be financed, either by further increases in government debt or by increases in taxes, or both. This raises considerable uncertainty about the future stance of fiscal policy. Given the distortionary nature of these fiscal policy instruments, current deficits may therefore have substantial effects on the long-term prospects of the economy. In particular, short-run stabilization of the economy may come at the cost of dimmer and uncertain long-term growth prospects.
In this paper, we examine fiscal policy design in an environment in which the government faces an explicit trade-off between short-run stabilization and long-run welfare prospects. In the spirit of Stokey and Lucas (1983) , our public authorities finance an exogenous stochastic government expenditure stream through a mix of public debt and labor income taxes. Our model, however, differs substantially from that of Stokey and Lucas (1983) in at least two dimensions. First, our economy grows at an endogenous rate determined by incentives to innovate as in Romer (1990) .
By altering labor taxes, therefore, fiscal policy can affect the market value of innovative products and ultimately long-run growth. Second, we adopt Epstein and Zin (1989) recursive preferences so that agents care about the intertemporal distribution of consumption risk. Specifically, we assume that agents have a preference for early resolution of uncertainty and hence are averse to long-run growth risks as defined by Bansal and Yaron (2004) .
In this setting, we analyze both exogenous fiscal policy as well as optimal Ramsey policy. We start by examining the implications of simple policy rules that link the stance of fiscal policy to macroeconomic quantities. This analysis allows us to develop useful intuition about the tensions that the Ramsey planner faces when designing optimal fiscal policies in a setting with recursive preferences and endogenous growth. In a second step, we characterize optimal policies and the dynamics of allocations under the Ramsey plan.
Our first quantitative result concerns commonly observed countercyclical fiscal policies seeking to stabilize short-run fluctuations by means of public debt or, equivalently, tax smoothing in the sense of Barro (1979) . Using exogenously specified fiscal policy rules (similarly to Dotsey (1990) , Ludvigson (1996) , Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005) , Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007), Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2010) , Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010) and Li and Leeper (2010) ), we show that countercyclical policies can produce substantial welfare costs as high as of 2% of life-time consumption. Intuitively, while tax cuts stabilize the economy in the short-run upon the realization of adverse exogenous shocks, the subsequent financing needs associated with long-run budget balance produce uncertainty about future distortionary taxation. When tax distortions endogenously affect growth rates, this leads to more uncertainty about long-term growth prospects.
Hence, in asset pricing language, reducing the extent of short-run growth risk comes at the cost of increasing the economy's exposure to long-run risk.
In a setting with aversion to long-run uncertainty, the reallocation of consumption risk from the short-to the long-run can negatively affect welfare through two channels. First, as documented by Croce (2006) 's welfare calculations in endowment economy, when agents have a preference for early resolution of uncertainty, long-run consumption risk matters much more than short-run risk.
Second, in a Romer (1990) economy the unconditional average of consumption growth depends on the market value of cash-flows of new products created through innovation. By increasing longrun uncertainty, countercyclical fiscal policies depress the present value of future cash-flows and hence the incentive to grow. We discipline this asset pricing mechanism by calibrating the model to reproduce key feature of both U.S. consumption and wealth-consumption ratio as measured by Lustig, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Verdelhan (2010) and Alvarez and Jermann (2004) . Quantitatively, these two welfare cost channels outweigh the benefits of short-run stabilization, implying that common tax smoothing prescriptions obtained with time-additive preferences (see, among others, Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala (2002) ) are no longer optimal in settings with recursive preferences and endogenous growth.
More generally, these results suggest a relevant tension between short-run stabilization and long-term growth that an optimal policy has to balance. We formalize this intuition by analyzing the optimal Ramsey plan in our model and show that the optimal policy in our setting reflects two important intertemporal considerations absent in the benchmark Stokey and Lucas (1983) model. First, with recursive utility the Ramsey planner has to take into account the entire intertemporal distribution of tax distortions in order to optimize the intertemporal distribution of consumption risk. In a similar spirit as the results of Karantounias (2012) obtained in a robust fiscal policy framework, we find that in our model the planner uses debt as a device to reallocate tax distortions, and hence consumption risk, over time and across states to smooth continuation utility risk.
Second, in a Romer (1990) economy the planner has to provide optimal intertemporal incentives for innovation in order to optimize endogenous growth. Our Ramsey plan, therefore, has the notable feature of reflecting market valuations of cash-flow streams generated by the innovation process.
Since in our setup continuation utilities are an important component of the pricing kernel, the planner is called to take into account the entire future path of tax distortions to optimize the market value of innovation.
Although arising from independent elements of our model, these two intertemporal features of our Ramsey plan are tightly connected and quantitatively reinforce each other. Together, endogenous growth and recursive preferences let the intertemporal distribution of consumption risk be an important determinant of fiscal policy design. Ignoring the intertemporal composition of consumption risk can substantially bias our welfare costs-benefits analysis of fiscal interventions.
At a broader level, therefore, our study conveys the need of introducing risk considerations in the current fiscal policy debate.
Our methodological approach is related to several papers that study optimal fiscal policy in real business cycle models with uncertainty, from Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994) to Chugh and Ghironi (2010) . We differ from them because of our joint focus on recursive preferences and endogenous growth. Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993) consider Ramsey policies in an endogenous growth model as well, but they analyze accumulation of human capital and abstract from uncertainty and asset pricing considerations. In our analysis, in contrast, we link welfare costs of aggregate consumption fluctuations to asset prices in the spirit of Tallarini (2000) , and Alvarez and Jermann (2004) . We differ from them because we explicitly consider the welfare implications of government policies and link them to the market value of innovation and the intertemporal distribution of consumption risk.
Recently, several studies have focused on evaluating fiscal policies in asset pricing settings. Gomes, Michaelides, and Polkovnichenko (2010) calculate the distortionary costs of government bailouts in a model which is consistent with basic asset market data. Gomes, Michaelides, and Polkovnichenko (2009) analyze fiscal policies in an incomplete markets economy with heterogeneous agents. Panageas (2010a) and Panageas (2010b) study optimal taxation and the incentive to manage risk in the presence of public bailouts and liquidation costs. On the other hand, Pastor and Veronesi (2010) analyze announcement effects on stock prices after policy changes. None of these papers addresses optimal taxation and welfare costs in a risk-sensitive environment similar to ours. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first ones to identify fiscal policy as an important macroeconomic source of costly low-frequency fluctuations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We present the model in section 2, and discuss our quantitative results in section 3 and 4. In section 5 we introduce the Ramsey problem. Section 6 concludes.
Model
In this section we describe in detail the stochastic model of endogenous growth that we use to examine the link between long-run growth, fiscal policy and the distribution of consumption risk.
As in Romer (1990) , the only source of sustained productivity growth is related to the accumulation of new patents on innovations that facilitate the production of the final good. In this class of models, the speed of patents accumulation, ie, the growth rate of the economy, depends on the market value of the additional cash-flows generated by such innovations. Since we assume that the representative household has Epstein-Zin preferences, the market value of a patent is sensitive to both short-run and long-run growth risk. Asset pricing considerations are therefore required to explain the impact of a tax system on the equilibrium growth rate of the economy.
For simplicity, we abstract from physical capital accumulation. The production of the final good is assumed to depend only on three elements: (i) an exogenous stochastic and stationary productivity process, (ii) the stock of patents, and (iii) the endogenous amount of labor supplied.
In our model, labor income is taxed proportionally by the government to finance an exogenous stochastic expenditure stream. In what follows, we show that smoothing distortional taxation using public debt affects both short-and long-run patents' cash-flows, ultimately altering the equilibrium growth rate of the economy. In this sense, choosing a tax system is equivalent to choosing a specific intertemporal distribution of growth risk.
Household
The representative household has Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences,
defined over a CES aggregator, u t , of consumption, C t , and leisure, 1 − L t :
We let L t , γ, ψ and ν denote labor, relative risk aversion, elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and degree of complementarity between leisure and consumption, respectively. Leisure is multiplied by A t , our measure of standards of living, to guarantee balanced growth when ν ̸ = 1.
When ψ = In each period, the household chooses labor, consumption, equity shares, Z t+1 , and state contingent public debt holdings, B t+1 (h t+1 ), to maximize utility according to the following budget constraint:
where D t denotes aggregate dividends (specified in equation (14)), Q t is the market value of an equity share, and Q B t (h t+1 ) is the price of a public bond paying one unit of consumption at time t + 1 in state h t+1 . Wages, W t , are taxed at a possibly time-varying rate τ t .
In our setup the stochastic discount factor in the economy is given by
where the last factor captures aversion to continuation utility risk, ie, long-run growth risk. Optimality implies the following asset pricing conditions:
where f (·) is the equilibrium conditional probability density function. At the equilibrium, the representative agent holds the entire supply of equities, normalized to be one for simplicity (i.e., Z t = 1 ∀t), and bonds. The intratemporal optimality condition on labor takes the following form:
and implies that the household's labor supply is directly affected by fiscal policy.
Technology
Final Good Firm. There is a representative and competitive firm that produces the single final output good in the economy, Y t , using labor, L t , and a bundle of intermediate goods, X it . We assume that the production function for the final good is specified as follows:
where, Ω t denotes an exogenous stationary stochastic productivity process
and A t is the total measure of intermediate goods in use at date t.
This competitive firm takes prices as given and chooses intermediate goods and labor to maximize profits as follows:
where P it is the price of intermediate good i at time t. At the optimum:
, and 
At the optimum, monopolists charge a constant markup over marginal cost:
Given the symmetry of the problem for all the monopolistic firms, we get:
Equation (5) and (7) allow us to express final output in the following compact form:
Since both labor and productivity are stationary, the long run growth rate of output is determined by the expansion of intermediate goods variety, A t . This expansion is originated in the research and development sector that we describe below.
Research and Development. Innovators develop new intermediate goods for the production
of final output and obtain patents on them. At the end of the period, these patents are sold to new intermediate goods firms in a competitive market. Starting from next period on, the new monopolists produce the new varieties and make profits. We assume that each existing variety dies, ie, becomes obsolete, with probability δ ∈ (0, 1). In this case, its production is terminated.
Given these assumptions, the value cum-dividend of an existing variety, V it , is equal to the present value of all future expected profits and can be recursively expressed as follows:
Let 1/ϑ t be the marginal rate of transformation of final goods into new varieties. The free-entry condition in the R&D sector implies that at the equilibrium:
The left-hand side of the free-entry condition measures the marginal cost of producing an extra variety. The right-hand side, instead, is equal to the end-of-the-period market value of the new patents. Equation (10) is extremely relevant in this class of models because it implicitly pins down the optimal level of investment in R&D and ultimately the growth rate of the economy. To better explain this point, let S t denote the units of final good devoted to R&D investment, and notice that in our economy the total mass of varieties evolves according to
from which we obtain
As often done in the literature, we impose
in order to capture the idea that concepts already discovered make it easier to come up with new ideas, ∂ϑ/∂A > 0, and that R&D investment has decreasing marginal returns, ∂ϑ/∂S < 0.
Combining equations (10)- (12), we obtain the following optimality condition for investment:
where M t+j|t ≡ ∏ j s M t+s|t is the j-steps ahead pricing kernel and M t|t ≡ 1. Equation (13) suggests that the amount of innovation intensity in the economy, S t /A t , is directly related to the discounted value of future profits and, ultimately, future labor conditions. When agents expect labor above steady state, they will have an incentive to invest more in R&D, ultimately boosting long-run growth. Viceversa, when agents expect labor to remain below steady state, they will revise downward their evaluation of patents and will reduce their investment in innovation and, therefore, future growth. We discuss this intuition further in section 2.3.
1 This dynamic equation is consistent with our assumption that new patents survive for sure in their first period of life. If new patents are allowed to immediately become obsolete, equation (10) and (11) need to be replaced by A t+1 = (1 − δ)(ϑ t S t + A t ) and Stock Market. Given the multi-sector structure of the model, various assumptions on the constituents of the stock market can be adopted. We assume that the stock market value includes all the production sectors described above, namely, the final good, the intermediate goods and the R&D sector. Taking into account the fact that both the final good and the R&D sector are competitive, aggregate dividends are simply equal to monopolistic profits net of investment:
At the equilibrium, the ex-dividends stock market value Q t can be rewritten as follows:
Government. The government faces an exogenous and stochastic expenditure stream, G t , that evolves as follows:
where
This specification ensures that G t ∈ (0 Y t ) ∀t. In order to finance this expenditure, the government can use tax income, T t = τ t W t L t , or public debt according to the following budget constraint:
Aggregate Resource Constraint. In this economy, the final good market clearing condition implies:
Final output, therefore, is used for consumption, R&D investment, production of intermediate goods, and public expenditure.
Some Properties of the Equilibrium
Combining equations (10)- (13), we obtain the following expression for growth rate in the economy:
The relevance of equation (17) is twofold, since it enables us to discuss both the interaction between recursive preferences and endogenous growth, and the role played by the tax system.
First, we point out that in this framework, growth is a monotone transformation of the discounted value of future profits. This implies that the average growth in the economy is endogenously negatively related to both the discount rate used by the household and the amount of perceived risk.
When the household has standard time additive preferences, only short-run profits risk matters for the determination of the value of a patent. When the agent has recursive preferences, instead, optimal growth depends also on the endogenous amount of volatility in expected long-run profits.
Second, since profits are proportional to labor, and labor supply is sensitive to the tax rate, a fiscal system based on tax smoothing ultimately introduces long-lasting fluctuations in future profits and tends to depress patent value slowing down the entire economy. Short-run tax stabilization, therefore, comes at the cost of reduced long-run growth. This tension is the core of our welfare analysis.
Calibration
We report our benchmark calibration in 
Notes -This table reports the benchmark quarterly calibration of our model. All parameters are chosen according to the discipline proposed by Kung and Schmid (2010) .
tive risk aversion, intertemporal elasticity of substitution and subjective discount factor are set to replicate the low historical average of the risk-free rate and the consumption claim risk premium estimated by Lustig, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Verdelhan (2010) . Replicating these asset-pricing moments is important because it imposes a strict discipline on the way in which innovations are priced and average growth is determined. All other parameters are chosen consistently with the endogenous growth literature (see Kung and Schmid (2010) for a broader discussion).
A simple exogenous fiscal policy
In this section we use an exogenous fiscal policy generating tax smoothing in order to have some insights on the trade-off between short-run stabilization and long-run growth faced by the government. The optimal debt financing policy is the focus of section 5. Here we use a simple and flexible debt policy to analyze endogenous variations in the composition of consumption risk for given characteristics of the tax system. In particular, we assume for the time being that the government has access to state uncontingent debt. Therefore, we substitute equations (2) and (16) Table ( 
is the fraction of hours worked. All moments are annualized. All figures are multiplied by 100, except ACF 1 (∆c), the first-order autocorrelation of consumption growth. The log discount factor is denoted by m, and τ is the tax rate. r C and r f are the return of the consumption claim and the risk-free bond, respectively.
following expressions:
We specify the following fiscal policy rule on debt-output ratio:
where L SS is the steady state level of labor, and ρ B ∈ (0, 1) and ϕ B ≥ 0 measure the inverse of the speed of repayment of debt and the intensity of the policy, respectively.
When ϕ B > 0, this policy rule captures the behavior of a government that is concerned about employment and wants to minimize labor fluctuations. In particular, the government cuts labor taxes (increases debt) when labor is below steady state and increases them (reduces debt) in periods of boom for the labor market. The convenience of working with this policy is twofold. First, with time-additive preferences, this simple policy improves welfare against a zero-deficit policy, ie, against the no tax smoothing case, ϕ B = 0. This is relevant because it implies that we are working with a policy that can bring the economy closer to the Ramsey second best, at least with time additive preferences. We prove and explain this point in detail in section 4.2. Second, this policy rule allows us to focus only on the two most important dimensions of a tax system, namely the intensity of tax-smoothing, ϕ B , and its persistence, ρ B .
The condition ρ B < 1 ensures that the public administration wants to keep the debt-output ratio stationary. In the language of Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010), we anchor expectations about debt and rule out unsustainable paths. Since in our economy with recursive preferences the following holds:
the unconditional average of both debt and deficit is zero. Under this policy, therefore:
In figure ? ? show the response of the tax rate after a positive shock to government expenditure and a negative shock to productivity, respectively. According to (19), in both cases the government responds to these shocks by initially lowering the tax rate below the level required to have zero deficit. Over the long-horizon, instead, the government increases taxation above average in order to run surpluses and repay debt. This is true both with recursive and time-additive preferences. In the next section, we show in detail how this tax smoothing behavior alters the composition of output and consumption risk. 
Inspecting the mechanism
Terminology. Let Z t be a stochastic process generated by our model. We can always decompose Z t as follows:
In what follows, we refer to X Z and ϵ Z as the long-and short-run component of Z, respectively.
In our economy, the unpredictable changes of Z and X Z are a function of the both government expenditure and the productivity shocks, and the fiscal policy parameters, ρ B and ϕ B :
In the next sections, we use impulse response functions to characterize f Z and f X Z for several variables of interest across different fiscal policies. Ultimately, this helps us to characterize the four main dimensions of the distribution of risk of any random variable Z t , i.e., the amount of short-run risk, StD t (Z t+1 ), the magnitude of long-run risk, StD(X Z,t ), the persistence of the long-run component, ACF 1 (X Z,t ), and the unconditional average E[Z t ].
When we impose Z t = ∆c t , this decomposition allows us to study the asset pricing and the welfare implications of our model in the spirit of Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Croce (2006) , respectively. Abstracting from time-varying volatility, they model consumption as follows: Recursive preferences case. We start our analysis by comparing a zero-deficit policy with countercyclical fiscal policies characterized by different intensity level, ϕ B . We denote as 'Weak', 'Medium' and 'Strong' the case in which ϕ B is equal to .3%, .45%, and .6%, respectively. The zero-deficit policy corresponds to setting ϕ B = 0.
The main results obtained from these four calibrations are reported in table 3. In figure 1 and 2 we plot the impulse response of key variables of interest after a positive one-standard deviation shock to G/Y, and a negative one-standard deviation shock to productivity, respectively. In these figures, we plot impulse responses only for the extreme cases of zero-deficit and strong countercyclical policy.
The top-left panel of figure 1 shows that when an adverse government shock materializes, labor tends to fall. This is due to the substitution effect: a higher level of government expenditure requires a higher tax rate that depresses the supply of labor services. When the government implements a strong tax smoothing policy, the immediate increase in the tax rate is less severe and for this reason labor falls less than under the zero-deficit policy. The top-right panel of figure 1 shows that this short-run stabilization comes at the cost of a lower expected recovery speed. At all possible horizons, indeed, the expected growth rate of labor under the tax-smoothing policy is lower than under the zero-deficit policy. This effect is due to the fact that over time the government keeps taxes at a higher level in order to repay public debt. In this sense, the government is trading off short-run labor volatility for long-run labor volatility by making the effects of government expenditure shocks less severe on impact, but more long-lasting.
According to equation (8), labor growth is relevant to understand what happens to aggregate output growth in both the short-and the long-run. The two middle panels of figure 1 show that under the tax-smoothing policy, the government is able to reduce the drop in output growth when the shock materializes (left panel). This stabilazation effect, however, comes at the cost of amplifying the drop in expected long-run growth (right panel). The impulse response of both realized and expected output growth reflect what happens to labor growth and take also into account the fact that after an increase in government expenditure there are less resources allocated to R&D, hence, the innovation speed, A t+1 /A t , declines as well.
What discussed so far is also true when the economy is subject to a negative productivity shock.
As shown in figure 2 , the tax-smoothing policy is able to reduce the short-run fall in employment only at the cost of having a slower recovery for both employment and output.
Finally, the bottom two panels of figure 1 and 2 show that the tax-smoothing policy alters the consumption growth composition exactly as it does for output growth: smoothing labor taxes implies a reduction of short-run consumption volatility against an increase in the volatility of expected future growth after both G/Y and productivity shocks. Furthermore, the tax-smoothing policy tends to make expected consumption growth more persistent, ie, it makes the impact of the exogenous shocks on consumption more long-lasting. This trade-off can be better seen in table 3 where we show that as ϕ B increases, the volatility of consumption, σ(∆c), declines while the halflife of the consumption long-run component, E t [∆c t+1 ], increases. Since the long-run component of consumption is relatively small, the overall persistence of consumption growth, ACF 1 (∆c), is only marginally affected and is consistent with the data.
Table 3 also shows that the unconditional growth rate of consumption is declining in the intensity of tax smoothing, ϕ B . This result follows directly from the afore mentioned reallocation of risk from the short-to the long-run. In order to better explain this point, note that the unconditional growth rate in the economy is determined by the no-arbitrage equation (17), in which the Tables 1 and 3 . The diamond shaped markers refer to the zero-deficit policy (ϕ B = 0). The solid line is associated to a strong countercyclical fiscal policy (ϕ B =.6%).
growth of the economy depends on the value of patents. In an economy with recursive preferences, the intertemporal distribution of consumption and profits risk matters when pricing pantent and innovation benefits. Tables 1 and 3 . The diamond shaped markers refer to the zero-deficit policy (ϕ B = 0). The solid line is associated to a strong countercyclical fiscal policy (ϕ B =.6%).
In our case, as ϕ B increases, the increase in long-run profits and consumption risk dominates on the decline in short-run risk and let future profits be discounted at a higher rate. This explains why a more intense tax-smoothing policy ultimately depresses patents' value and average growth.
Note also that when patents' value declines, less varieties are accumulated in the economy, in turn reducing the marginal product of labor. This is the reason why in table 3 the average amount of labor supplied declines together with the unconditional mean of consumption growth. Ultimately, the average tax rete, E[τ ], has to be higher in order to finance government spending with a lower level of average labor income. In a model with endogenous growth, therefore, the financing mix of taxes and debt significantly matters since it feeds-back on the average growth of the economy and alters the average amount of tax distortions required to finance a given expenditure. . 'Weak', 'Medium', and 'Strong' policies are generated by calibrating ϕ B to .3%, .45%, and .6%, respectively. Horizontal axis corresponds to different annualized autocorrelation, ρ 4 B , of debt to output ratio, B G /Y ; the higher the autocorrelation, the lower the speed of repayment. Furthermore, figure 3 shows that the negative effects on patents valuation and growth become more and more severe when the smoothing attitude, ρ B , increases. More persistent tax rate fluctuations amplify long lasting risk and depress growth even though short-run stabilization is achieved.
Taken together, these results suggest that the intertemporal distribution of tax distortion matters when the agent has recursive preferences,.
Time additive preferences case. We now set Ψ = 1/γ = .1 to study the time additive Tables 1 and 3 , except the IES that is set to 1/γ = .1. The diamond shaped markers refer to the zero-deficit policy (ϕ B = 0). The solid line is associated to a strong countercyclical fiscal policy (ϕ B =.6%). The plots in panel a) refer to the case of an adverse shock to G/Y (ϵ G > 0). Panel b), instead, refers to a negative productivity shock, ϵ < 0.
preferences, long-run expectations under the tax-smoothing and the zero-deficit policy basically coincide. In other words, the optimal allocation of labor and R&D investment is not significantly sensitive to the public financing scheme. Since the agent does not care about the timing of resolution of tax uncertainty, the government is now able to promote short-run stabilazation without negatively altering the long-run growth of the economy.
In figure 5 we see that a tax-smoothing policy is now able to increase the value of patents, independently of the persistence of the tax rate, ie, the speed of repayment of debt, ρ B . The origin of this result is twofold. On the one end, this figure shows that with time-additive preferences the profits distribution is basically unaltered. On the other hand, figure 4 shows that the tax-smoothing policy is able to partially reduce short-run consumption growth volatility, in turn reducing the total market price of risk and the discount rate applied to profits. It is important to notice, though, that the improvement in the patents value obtained through tax-smoothing is very small, even in the case in which the intensity of the policy is 'strong'. This remark is important because in the next section we will see that the benefits of tax-smoothing with time-additive preferences are tiny. Tables 1, except the IES that is set to 1/γ = .1. The three lines reported in each plot are associated to different levels of intensity of the countercyclical fiscal policy described in equation (19) . 'Weak', 'Medium', and 'Strong' policies are generated by calibrating ϕ B to .3%, .45%, and .6%, respectively. Horizontal axis corresponds to different annualized autocorrelation, ρ 4 B , of debt to output ratio, B G /Y ; the higher the autocorrelation, the lower the speed of repayment.
Welfare implications of tax-smoothing
As in Lucas (1987) , we compute welfare costs, W C, in terms of percentage of life-time consumption and use the zero-deficit consumption process as benchmark:
Note that we are comparing the welfare generated by consumption processes with different intertemporal composition of risk and that these different consumption distributions are a direct result of the intensity of the tax smoothing, ϕ B , and the persistence of the tax rate, ρ B .
The last two rows of table 3 show that as the government increases the intensity of its policy, the household welfare decreases. Figure 6 shows that the welfare costs of tax-smoothing are actually increasing in both the intensity and the persistence parameters.
These welfare costs are generated by the fact that our simple tax-smoothing policy is essentially trading off short-run volatility (StD t (∆c t+1 ), top-right panel) against long-run consumption risk Furthermore, when the government implements tax-smoothing policies, the unconditional average growth rate of consumption, E[∆c t ], declines as a result of the drop in patents' value mentioned in the previous section. To summarize, short-run stabilazation, comes at the cost of slower growth and higher uncertainty for the long-run. Taking into account the fact that the annual persistence of debt-output ratio, ρ 4 B , in the US is .99, the welfare costs can be as high as 2% of lifetime consumption, a substantial amount.
In figure 7 , we show that these results are totally reversed in a world with time-additive preferences. In this case, in fact, this simple tax-smoothing policy reaches its ultimate goal of improving welfare by stabilazing short-run fluctuations in labor. The resulting welfare benefits, however, are small, as small is the improvement in the average value of the patents described in the previous section.
Long-run distortions versus crowding out
So far we have assumed that the government uses taxes to finance an unproductive government expenditure. This assumption, however, introduces uncertainty about both the substitution effect and the crowding-out effect, i.e., the negative income effect generated by government expenditure.
In order to disentangle the crowding-out effect from the pure intertemporal redistribution of consumption risk, in this section we assume that the government uses taxes to finance a mandatory lump-sum transfer to the household, T R t , that replaces G t in equation (15). The consumer and Tables 1 and 3 . The three lines reported in each plot are associated to different levels of intensity of the countercyclical fiscal policy described in equation (19) . 'Weak', 'Medium', and 'Strong' policies are generated by calibrating ϕ B to .3%, .45%, and .6%, respectively. Horizontal axis corresponds to different annualized autocorrelation, ρ 4 B , of debt to output ratio, B G /Y ; the higher the autocorrelation, the lower the speed of repayment. Welfare costs are calculated as in section 4.2. government budget constraints and the resource constraint become, respectively:
This specification allows us to keep all marginal distortions in the first order conditions without having to deal with the change in the allocation generated by changes in G t . Tables 1 and 3 . The three lines reported in each plot are associated to different levels of intensity of the countercyclical fiscal policy described in equation (19) . 'Weak', 'Medium', and 'Strong' policies are generated by calibrating ϕ B to .3%, .45%, and .6%, respectively. Horizontal axis corresponds to different annualized autocorrelation, ρ 4 B , of debt to output ratio, B G /Y ; the higher the autocorrelation, the lower the speed of repayment. Welfare costs are calculated as in section 4.2. the long-run behavior of consumption and produces welfare costs with recursive preferences. The crowding-out effect produced by government expenditure is relevant, but it explains just a small fraction of the welfare costs that we found in the previous section.
Optimal labor taxation
The time-zero problem. The time-zero Ramsey's problem can be written as follows: Tables 1, except for the IES, ψ = 1/γ = .1. The three lines reported in each plot are associated to different levels of intensity of the countercyclical fiscal policy described in equation (19) . 'Weak', 'Medium', and 'Strong' policies are generated by calibrating ϕ B to .3%, .45%, and .6%, respectively. Horizontal axis corresponds to different annualized autocorrelation, ρ 4 B , of debt to output ratio, B G /Y ; the higher the autocorrelation, the lower the speed of repayment. Welfare costs are calculated as in section 4.2. In this figure, we assumed taxes are used to finance lump-sum transfer to household. subject to
The first three constraints are standard in the literature, as they capture the aggregate resource constraint, the implementability constraint, and the accumulation of the stock of varieties, respectively. The last constraint, instead, is not standard as it is based on a forward looking no-arbitrage condition that implicitly pins down the optimal accumulation of varieties in the decentralized econ-
omy.
In what follows, let u
Ram,EZ C,t
be the multiplier attached to the resource constraint with recursive preferences; ξ be the multiplier related to the implementability constraint; Γ t be the multiplier for the accumulation of varieties; O t be the multiplier attached to the free-entry condition for patents,
, and
. All these multipliers are multiplied by an appropriate common discount factor to make them stationary.
Optimality. The is the multiplier obtained with time additive preferences and exogenous growth in a standard Stokey and Lucas (1983) economy.
Equation (20), shows that the shadow value of consumption under the optimal tax system can be decomposed in three different parts. The first component has to do with the multiplier that we would get with time additive preferences (i.e., when W 11 = W 22 = 0) in a model without free-entry condition. depend on the continuation utility of the agent, U t .
The last component takes into account the fact that the tax system can alter the growth of the economy by altering the private evaluation of the patents, V t . It is this term that forces Ramsey to take seriously asset prices in order to find the optimal balance between growth and stabilization.
With recursive preferences, Ξ C,t is sensitive to continuation utility risk on top of consumption risk.
For this reason, Ramsey is called to adopt a tax system that optimally trades off current and future risk.
The first order condition with respect to labor states that: 
where M P L t is the marginal product of labor, and M RS Ram,EZ Ct,Lt is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor under the optimal Ramsey plan. Equation 21 suggests two important results: i) Ramsey determines the current tax after accounting for the future distortions, F D, possibly generated by debt financing; and ii) the optimal taxation rate is a function of the private evaluation of growth opportunities, V t .
Finally, the first order condition with respect to capital implies the following adjusted noarbitrage equation: 
Properties of the Optimal Labor Taxation
[TO BE ADDED ]
Conclusion
Recent fiscal interventions have raised concerns about US public debt, future fiscal pressure, and long-run economic growth. This paper studies fiscal policy design in an economy in which: (i) the household has recursive preferences and is averse to both short-and long-run uncertainty, and (ii) growth is endogenously sustained through innovations whose market value is sensitive to the tax system. By reallocating tax distortions through debt, fiscal policy alters the composition of intertemporal consumption risk and the incentives to innovate, ultimately affecting long-term growth.
We find that countercyclical tax policies promoting short-run stabilization substantially increase long-run uncertainty and produce welfare losses as high as 2% of lifetime consumption. Intuitively, tax cuts successful at stabilizing the economy in the short-run upon the realization of adverse exogenous shocks, produce subsequent financing needs to restore long-run budget balance that generate uncertainty about future tax distortions. When tax distortions endogenously affect growth rates, this leads to more uncertainty about long-term growth prospects. Hence, in asset pricing language, reducing the extent of short-run growth risk comes at the cost of increasing the economy's exposure to long-run risk. Since our representative agent is averse to late resolution of uncertainty, more long-run risk imply lower welfare and lower incentives to invest in innovation and long-term growth.
In our setup, optimal fiscal policy corresponds to finding the distribution of consumption risk that optimizes both the market value of innovation and the timing of resolution of uncertainty.
Equivalently, public debt arises as a device to reallocate tax distortions, and hence consumption risk, over time and across states, ultimately smoothing continuation utilities. At a broader level, our analysis conveys the need of introducing risk considerations in the current fiscal policy debate.
